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Arthur Bueno
The Psychic Life of Freedom:  
Social Pathology and its Symptoms1
Abstract This paper discusses the relationship between Axel Honneth’s 
intersubjective theory of recognition and his political theory of democratic ethical 
life by addressing the potentials and difficulties attached to the notion of social 
pathology. Taking into account the diverse uses of this concept throughout 
Honneth’s oeuvre, it focuses initially on two of its formulations: first, the more 
recent discussions presented in “The Diseases of Society”, some of which can 
be read in continuity with arguments presented in Freedom’s Right; second, an 
implicit conception of social pathology that can be found in Struggle for Recognition. 
These formulations involve contrastingly different premises with regard to 
phenomenological, methodological, social-ontological and etiological matters. I 
argue that such differences can be better grasped if one bears in mind two 
distinctive ways of understanding the fundamental intuition at the basis of the 
notion of social pathology: either as an analogy or as a homology. By disclosing 
the actual or potential discrepancies between both conceptions, the aim is to 
outline the grounds on which they could be brought together within the framework 
of a comprehensive concept. With this purpose, I then critically examine a third 
conception of social pathology which was first presented in Suffering from 
Indeterminacy and later developed, with some restrictions, in Freedom’s Right. 
Finally, a definition of social pathology is suggested which can bring together 
the different contributions of each conception while avoiding their pitfalls.
Keywords: social pathology, recognition, freedom, suffering, social ontology, 
analogy, homology, Axel Honneth
The notion of social pathology holds a central place in contemporary critical 
theory and especially in Axel Honneth’s philosophical work (cf. Honneth 1996 
[1994], Honneth 2009 [2004]). Yet, this is also one of the categories that went 
through more modifications along his intellectual trajectory. In this concept, 
perhaps more than in any other, were expressed some of the main changes in 
Honneth’s theory, both in terms of its philosophical foundations and of the 
challenges presented by the diagnosis of the present time. As a consequence, 
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to this “nearly impossible concept” (Honneth 2014) was ascribed a wide vari-
ety of meanings, among which it may seem difficult to find a common core.2
In the following, some initial steps will be taken towards a conception of 
social pathology capable of combining conceptual breadth and consistency. 
Taking into account the diverse uses of this concept throughout Honneth’s 
oeuvre, I will mainly focus on three of its formulations. First, the more re-
cent discussions  on the topic – especially those presented in “The Diseases 
of Society” – will be examined with a view to highlighting its central features 
as well as its potentially problematic aspects. To that end, four dimensions 
of the concept will be considered: (a) phenomenological, (b) methodologi-
cal, (c) social-ontological, and (d) etiological. Second, an implicit conception 
of social pathology that can be found in Struggle for Recognition will be re-
viewed and contrasted to Honneth’s more recent arguments on the subject. 
By disclosing the actual or potential discrepancies between both conceptions, 
the aim is to outline the grounds on which they could be brought together 
within the framework of a comprehensive concept of social pathology. With 
this in mind, finally, I will analyse the transformations of the conception of 
“pathologies of freedom” which was first presented in Suffering from Inde-
terminacy and later developed, with some restrictions, in Freedom’s Right, as 
well as suggest ways of avoiding its pitfalls.
The Diseases of Society: Four Dimensions
The first question one must address in order to characterize social patholo-
gies is how to phenomenologically define the psychological experiences which 
can be associated with them (a). Honneth states in Freedom’s Right that “such 
pathologies certainly cannot be interpreted as a social accumulation of in-
dividual pathologies or psychological disorders”. The symptoms in which 
social pathologies are reflected would rather appear in tendencies to “a cer-
tain rigidity in [...] social behaviour and relation-to-self expressed by diffuse 
moods of depression [Niedergedrücktheit] or a loss of orientation” (Honneth 
2014 [2011]: 86-87). In a similar vein, Honneth has more recently argued 
that in order to diagnose societal functional disturbances it is sufficient to 
notice something “odd or irritating about social life”. The diagnosis of social 
pathologies would thus rely on “behavioural abnormalities” among members 
of society or “cases of merely vague indications of a social discontent, or even 
simply a diffuse prevailing social atmosphere” (Honneth 2014: 687, 690). The 
2 For a review of the uses of this category in Honneth’s work, see Freyenhagen 2015. 
In contrast with the latter approach, my purpose is not to discuss in detail all the differ-
ent meanings of the notion of social pathology in Honneth’s writings, but rather to 
critically reconstruct them in order to outline a more comprehensive and cohesive 
concept. For another overview of Honneth’s conceptions of social pathology, cf. Laitin-
en, Särkelä and Ikäheimo 2015.
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main thrust of these arguments is to release the diagnosis of social patholo-
gies from the necessity of relying on the accumulation of medically diagnosed 
mental illnesses, which played an important role in previous versions of the 
concept. However, it is not only psychological disorders which have ceased to 
be considered crucial to the diagnosis of social pathologies. In some passages 
of “The Diseases of Society” and of Honneth’s recent remarks on the subject 
(Honneth 2015a), this position is pushed even further: while the symptoms 
alluded to in Freedom’s Right still refer to experiences that might display some 
degree of suffering, even if the term is avoided, in his later writings this is no 
longer the case, and the idea of a necessary reference to such ind of experi-
ence is explicitly refused.3 Honneth then holds that “societal abnormalities, 
which raise suspicion about something being pathological, can also consist of 
behavioural patterns that cause no individual suffering and thus also do not 
necessarily constitute psychic disorders” (Honneth 2014: 691).
One should notice that, in passages such as the latter, the term ‘suffering’ is 
applied only to cases of mental illnesses as physicians might diagnose them 
or which are perceived by individuals as a condition requiring therapeu-
tic treatment. A sharp distinction between social behavioural problems (i.e. 
“visible abnormalit[ies] in ordinary behaviour”) and mental disorders (i.e. 
“suffering from mental impairments which are recognizable by individuals”) 
then becomes crucial to Honneth’s argument. He refuses to equate such be-
havioural abnormalities with mental disorders, for this “would lead us to set 
a very low bar for qualifying as a mental disorder, and would thereby down-
play the suffering of the genuinely mentally ill”. Diagnoses of social patholo-
gies could primarily rely – as it would be the case in Adorno’s and Foucault’s 
analyses – on “common enough behaviour patterns that are without any res-
onance within the subject in question” and might not appear to the latter as 
“perceived suffering” (Honneth 2015a: 216). Judging by this last passage, it 
may seem that Honneth’s intention is to unlink the diagnosis of social pa-
thologies solely from mental illnesses and from suffering as perceived by the 
subjects themselves. However, at other times this decoupling is clearly taken 
further and related to experiences of suffering in general, be them reflec-
tively perceived as such or merely felt. It would then be a matter of refusing 
altogether the “idea that the ‘suffering’ of the subjects would always provide 
a warrant for the initial diagnosis of a pathology”: one should rather avoid 
inflating this category, pushing it “at too far a remove from the experience 
of subjectively felt discomfort” (Honneth 2015a: 216-17).
However, while it seems plausible to claim that social pathologies are not 
necessarily expressed in mental illnesses or perceived suffering, the same may 
3 It is also worth noting that in Freedom’s Right Honneth still talks about “symptoms”, 
whereas in more recent writings the term is avoided. Cf. Honneth 2014 [2011]: 86-87. 
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not be said of subjectively felt discomfort. Whether this experience is desig-
nated as suffering or not, we should assume that a social pathology must in 
some way resonate negatively within the subjects in question, or it would 
not make sense to attach such a strong expression to it. Neither would it be 
clear where the motivation to overcome a given social pathology could come 
from. Without relying on the subjects’ negative experiences (even if these are 
not reflectively perceived as such), the reference point needed to establish 
certain modes of behaviour as problematic seems to be lost and the ascrip-
tion of behavioural abnormalities appears as an arbitrary act of the analyst, 
with the corresponding risks of what Maeve Cooke (2006) called epistemo-
logical and ethical authoritarianism.
Such a stance regarding the phenomenological dimension of social pathol-
ogies also has specific methodological implications (b). The disconnection of 
societal disturbances from psychic illnesses and experiences of suffering is 
initially based on the assumption that it is not feasible to build such a diag-
nosis by relying on empirical research. In Freedom’s Right, Honneth states 
that the diffuse moods which constitute a first indication of a social pathol-
ogy only seldom can be directly perceived in empirical investigations, since 
the “analytical tools used by sociological researchers are generally too blunt 
to capture such diffuse moods or collective sentiments”. Thus, indirect dis-
plays of these symptoms should be looked for in novels, films or works of art 
(Honneth 2014 [2011]: 87). In “The Diseases of Society”, likewise, behavioural 
abnormalities are seen as displaying a lower degree of visibility than the 
symptoms by which therapists or physicians diagnose an individual’s illness.
Once more, however, Honneth’s latest stance seems to consist in a more rad-
icalized version of the previous one: in his recent remarks on the subject, it 
is no longer simply a matter of difficult scientific access to those experiences 
but of their own epistemological status as expressions of social pathologies. 
Though conceding that “without the presence of some visible abnormality 
in ordinary behaviour we cannot have cause to consider whether a social 
pathology might be in play” – otherwise the analyst would not be in a posi-
tion to identify an impairment to individual freedom –, Honneth considers 
that such behavioural problems would initially be perceptible only from the 
perspective of an observer (Honneth 2015a: 216). Since one could not rely on 
conspicuous symptoms of psychic diseases or (perceived) suffering in order 
to formulate diagnoses of social pathologies, the latter should be based solely 
on behavioural abnormalities of limited visibility which are hardly perceiv-
able from the participant’s point of view. Only afterwards would the afflicted 
individuals be able to “confirm that these problems really are extant, if they 
– thanks to the diagnosis – are made capable of taking up and recognizing 
both their affliction and the underlying causes of it” (Honneth 2015a: 216).
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Yet, it is not clear how one should identify abnormalities in ordinary be-
haviour if not based on the lived experience of the subjects in question. 
Moreover, given that such problematic modes of behaviour constitute visi-
ble expressions of impairments to individual freedom, it seems one should 
assume that the latter are somehow subjectively felt. If this is so, then a di-
agnosis of social pathology must be able to identify or at least presume, by 
taking up the participant’s perspective, subjective indicators or symptomatic 
expressions of such impairments – which could, in a further step, be referred 
to disturbances in social reproduction.
These arguments do not stem only from Honneth’s stance with regard to phe-
nomenological and methodological issues, but also from his particular stand-
point in relation to social-ontological matters (c). In “The Diseases of Society”, 
it is argued that social pathologies consist in functional disturbances which 
take place “on a level set principally above that of the subjects” (Honneth 2014: 
700). Although they are expressed in certain moods or behavioral abnormali-
ties, these should not be confused with psychological functional disorders or 
with the (perceived) suffering of individuals, insofar as it is “the ‘society’ itself 
[which is] encroached upon by a particular disorganization of its social insti-
tutions in their functional efficiency” (Honneth 2014: 684). Diseases of soci-
ety should not be confused with the total amount of psychic illnesses affecting 
some sufficient number of singular persons, nor with the collective understood 
as a macro-subject with its own particular clinical syndrome. In rejecting the 
latter options, Honneth argues for “the strong thesis that diseases of society 
are separate phenomena, to be found solely at the level of society itself, not at 
the level of its individual members” (Honneth 2014: 688; emphasis added).
The claim that social pathologies are located only at the level of society and 
not of its individual members raises, however, some difficult questions from 
a social-theoretical perspective. Certainly, Honneth does not intend to es-
tablish a complete separation between these two levels; after all, diseases 
of society are seen to be expressed in behavioural abnormalities or diffuse 
moods experienced by its individual members. At times, his purpose seems 
to be merely the categorical clarification that functional disorders situated 
at one level are not always equally expressed as functional disorders at the 
other level. However, as this categorical argument is translated into the claim 
that an “ontological difference” (Honneth 2014: 688) holds between society 
and its members, the risk arises of incurring in a fallacy of misplaced con-
creteness (Whitehead 2011 [1925]) in the sense that two types of processes 
(social reproduction and psychological experience) come to be conceived as 
two different entities (society and the individual).
Given the Durkheimian accent of these formulations, we might turn to 
the writings of the French sociologist in order to highlight the potential 
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problematic aspects of such social ontological perspective. In Durkheim’s 
writings, this kind of fallacy is most visibly portrayed in the frequent tran-
sition from the premise that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts 
– which amounts to understanding social life as the product of relations 
between individuals and not the mere juxtaposition of their individual ex-
periences – to a tendency to personificate society in a “collective spirit”, an 
expression that “do[es] not have a mere verbal value but express[es] facts that 
are eminently concrete” (Durkheim 1975 [1887]: 272). Or in his account of 
the human being as “homo duplex”, divided between “our individuality – and 
more particularly, our body in which it is based” and “everything in us that 
expresses something other than ourselves” (Durkheim 1960 [1914]: 328), 
therewith assuming a split between individual and collective consciousness 
so that certain ideas and actions would have their origin in the former and 
others in the latter. While Honneth certainly does not make claims like these, 
one runs the risk of holding similar assumptions when social pathologies 
are defined as phenomena located solely within society as a sui generis enti-
ty, ontologically distinct from its individual members.
Based on such social-ontological arguments, Honneth advances two concep-
tions of the etiology of social pathologies (d). In a first, provisional definition, 
social pathologies are characterized as “the failure or disorder of a function 
whose fulfilment is required for the sake of the social order’s preservation” 
(Honneth 2014: 699), which means there would be as many diseases of so-
ciety as there are self-preserving social functions. However, since the latter 
are always culturally defined, they should be understood as representing 
particular demands that can only be introduced by taking into account the 
normative self-understanding and the institutional arrangement of a soci-
ety. Thus, “one can speak of a societal disease or pathology if a society in its 
institutional arrangement fails, according to its prevailing values, at one of 
the tasks it takes up within [its] functional cycles” (Honneth 2014: 699). Yet, 
such a definition seems to push aside the intuition underlying the concept of 
social pathology, namely the analogy to the notion of illness as “an interfer-
ence that we experience as a restriction of freedom”. Honneth’s proposal is 
that, in order to preserve the analogy which lies at the basis of the concept of 
social pathology, the latter should be conceived as consisting of disorders and 
frictions occurring at the “higher level” of the entanglement of diverse func-
tional spheres – that is, not at the level of society’s separate functional cycles 
but of their interplay.4 Thus, diseases of society would take place when the 
4 In “The Diseases of Society”, this interplay is conceived as one between the function-
al cycles of socialization, processing of nature, and regulation of relations of recognition. 
In The Idea of Socialism (2015b), however, the same argument is applied to the entanglement 
of the ‘ethical’ (sittlich) spheres of personal relationships, the market, and democratic 
will-formation. 
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institutional regulations of such spheres mutually prevent each other from 
successfully developing. With such a move, the parallel to the living organism 
would be preserved and, as in the case of individual illnesses, social pathol-
ogies would amount to “a troubled relationship of a subject [i.e. society] to 
its self” experienced as a restriction of freedom (Honneth 2014: 701). Corre-
spondingly, the realization of freedom would appear as the harmonious coop-
eration between social organs leading to society’s unhindered development.
One should not forget that all this is formulated from the perspective of the 
“higher ontological level” of society as a sui generis entity. Hence, in this context 
what is meant by freedom is, strictly speaking, society’s freedom, considered 
solely at the level of its relation to itself. It is evident that one should bear in 
mind Honneth’s concept of social freedom presented only three years earli-
er, as well as his recent comments relating social pathologies to impairments 
to individual freedom. Understood in such terms, however, the concept of 
“diseases of society” seems to be at odds with the latter premises. After all, a 
conception of social pathology which relies on a strict ontological distinction 
between society and its members does not seem fit to grasp the continuity 
among two kinds of troubled or “free” self-relations: of individuals to them-
selves and of society to itself. By conceiving the parallel between living and 
social organisms as a purely analogical one, such a framework is only equipped 
to understand the relation among them as either one of mere similarity or one 
of exterior causality. Moreover, the combination of a holistic social ontology 
with a purely analogical conception of social pathology has the consequence 
of demanding a significant restriction of the concept. The only possibility of 
conceiving social illnesses is, then, at the highest level of the interplay between 
“social organs”, hence leaving aside a considerable part of what Honneth him-
self has designated in the past as social-pathological phenomena.
Pathologies of Recognition: Analogical versus Homological 
Approaches
The problematic aspects of Honneth’s latest word on the subject can be fur-
ther addressed by way of a reinterpretation of previous versions of the con-
cept present in his work. Particularly relevant for this purpose is the fact that 
the analogy which lies at the basis of his more recent conception of social 
pathology has, seemingly, a previous version. In Struggle for Recognition, it is 
noted that individual experiences of disrespect are commonly described in 
terms of metaphors referring to “states of deterioration of the human body”, 
to “physical suffering and death” (Honneth 1995 [1992]: 135). Such meta-
phors imply an analogy between the “negative role that organic infections 
take on in the context of the reproduction of the body” and “the various 
forms of disregard for the psychological integrity of humans”: the experience 
of being socially denigrated or humiliated endangers the identity of human 
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beings, just as infection with a disease endangers their physical life. If this 
analogy seems plausible, as Honneth claims, it is first and foremost because 
“the comparison with physical illness prompts the idea of identifying, for the 
case of suffering social disrespect as well, a stratum of symptoms that, to a 
certain extent, make the subjects aware of the state they are in” – such as the 
sort of negative emotional reactions expressed in feelings of being ashamed 
or enraged, hurt or indignant (Honneth 1995 [1992]: 135). Hence, as physi-
cal illnesses constitute symptoms that make the subjects aware of threats to 
the reproduction of their physical body, certain negative emotional reactions 
could be seen as symptoms that signal threats to their psychological integrity.
Yet, such analogy does not hold only between organic and psychological 
states. For just as threats to the physical integrity of an organism emerge in 
the context of its relations with the environment, threats to its psychologi-
cal integrity generally arise in relationships with the social surroundings. So, 
becoming aware of the state one is in might involve not only acknowledging 
one’s psychological status, but also the social forms of disrespect to which 
one is subject. Unlike organic diseases, however, such socially produced and 
psychologically experienced disorders take place on the basis of the norma-
tive self-understanding of a historical epoch. They always emerge within a 
certain ‘grammar’ on which subjects rely to formulate their discontent and 
expectations regarding social relations in which they are involved. In mod-
ern societies, the language in which those forms of disrespect are articulat-
ed is, according to Honneth, founded on the idea of mutual recognition. By 
connecting threats to the psychological integrity of humans to social forms 
of disrespect, the framework presented in Struggle for Recognition thus es-
tablishes a fundamental connection between personal identity and social 
patterns of recognition.
The reason for this can again be seen in the constitutional dependence of 
humans on the experience of recognition. In order to acquire a success-
ful relation-to-self, one is dependent on the intersubjective recognition 
of one’s abilities and accomplishments. Were one never to experience this 
type of social approval at some stage of one’s development, this would 
open up a psychological gap within one’s personality, into which negative 
emotional reactions such as shame or rage could step. Hence, the experi-
ence of disrespect is always accompanied by affective sensations that are, 
in principle, capable of revealing to individuals the fact that certain forms 
of recognition are being withheld from them (Honneth 1995 [1992]: 135).
Those negative emotions are more than just an initial indicator of what might 
be involved in relations of disrespect; as symptoms, they already represent the 
first reaction of the organism to what threatens its psychological integrity. It 
is for this reason that they can be regarded as the motivational basis of mor-
al struggles for recognition. However, as in the case of organic threats, that 
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chain of reactions does not necessarily occur: a physical discomfort does not 
necessarily constitute a disease; a disease is not always perceived or diagnosed 
as such; and even diagnosed, one may not proceed to its treatment. Similarly, 
a negative emotion does not necessarily constitute a sign of a form of disre-
spect; experiences of disrespect are not always perceived as such; and they 
may not give rise to forms of social struggle for the establishment of relations 
of mutual recognition. But to the extent that this chain of reactions does takes 
place, social struggles for recognition can come to have a ‘therapeutic’ aspect, 
in that they constitute reactions against disturbed forms of social relation-
ship and self-relation motivated by the establishment of “social guarantees 
associated with those relations of recognition that are able to protect sub-
jects most extensively from suffering disrespect” (Honneth 1995 [1992]: 135).
Now one can observe that what is at stake in these arguments is more than 
an analogy. Disorders of organic and psychosocial type are not only simi-
lar in many respects; they are also in continuity with each other. Thus, if the 
metaphor presented in Struggle for Recognition makes sense, it is because it 
refers to the fact that disturbances in relations of mutual recognition effec-
tively constitute a threat to the individual life of human beings and, corre-
spondingly, to social life as a whole. The analogy between the biological and 
the socialized body might then reveal not only what is similar among them, 
but also that their similarity is dependent on their character as moments of 
the same vital process. Hence, one should speak in this context rather of ho-
mology than of analogy: while the latter comprises the establishment of su-
perficial similarities between two entities or processes, a homology entails 
a common causal mechanism that underlies their resemblance and thus the 
assumption of a real continuity between them (cf. Elster 2009: 7-8). Desig-
nating certain phenomena as social pathologies therefore amounts to consid-
ering that, as in the case of physical diseases, one is dealing with occurrences 
by means of which human life – both in its individual and social dimensions 
– is threatened in its integrity.
This homological perspective significantly modifies the way in which the re-
lationship between different analytical dimensions comes to be conceived in 
the diagnosis of social pathologies, in particular with regard to their symp-
tomatic expressions. As reactions to threats to psychic life, negative emo-
tions that arise in the context of experiences of disrespect are taken here as 
symptoms of social-pathological phenomena, but only at a first level of anal-
ysis. Beyond those emotional experiences, social pathologies would equal-
ly manifest themselves in disturbances which appear at the second level of 
the reproduction of intersubjective life and often lead to, as well as are op-
posed by, struggles for recognition. Finally, such a framework can be ex-
tended to the institutional realm of society, though in 1992 Honneth had not 
yet fully developed arguments in that direction: symptomatic indications of 
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social-pathological processes might then be detected at the level of institu-
tional life, in the form of disturbances and conflicts regarding the definition 
of dominant social roles and their interplay. Each of these phenomena counts 
as a symptom of social pathology because, at various levels, they consist in 
“frictions” in human life that represent threats to its integrity, as well as pro-
vide the latter with the impulse to reverse this condition. 
These arguments have important consequences for the concept of social pa-
thology. First, as in Honneth’s recent writings, the perspective developed in 
Struggle for Recognition does not establish a necessary connection between 
social pathologies and psychic diseases. However, it does relate the occur-
rence of social pathologies to negative emotions (sometimes referred to as 
‘suffering’), thus establishing a continuity between troubled forms of social 
relationship and experiences of subjectively felt discomfort. Even though it 
may be the case that in most situations this discomfort is not perceived by 
the afflicted subjects, hence largely appearing as a mere “diffuse prevailing 
social atmosphere”, one might find particular examples in which the under-
lying troubles are displayed in intensified form, either as perceived suffering 
or as psychological disorders.5
Second, this signals the possibility of empirically investigating social pathol-
ogies from the participant’s perspective. Subjects not only display their neg-
ative emotions in a number of implicit ways, but may also perceive them in 
moral or ethical terms. The social theorist is then able to anchor her own 
critical standpoint in the subject’s problematic experiences, either expressed 
in the ‘higher’ form of explicit manifestations of discontent or in the ‘deeper’ 
form of indirect displays of discomfort. Both of these represent the “pre-the-
oretical fact” (Honneth 2007 [1994]: 72) on the basis of which a critique of the 
relations of recognition can identify its own theoretical perspective in social 
reality and then, from a reconstructive standpoint, formulate its diagnoses 
by articulating the subjects’ (implicit or explicit) claims in social theoretical 
terms and developing them further.
Third, this implies a social theoretical standpoint that, while retaining the 
important categorical distinction between social reproduction and psycho-
logical experience, avoids the risk of building an ontological gap between 
them. Disorders in the process of social reproduction find expression in “ir-
ritations” within psychological experience as much as in “frictions” in pat-
terns of social relationship and their institutional crystallizations. Therefore, 
5  For instance, the disturbing consequences of consumerism (discussed in Honneth 
2014) can be more clearly identified in the experience of subjects who see themselves as 
compulsive buyers. At least that is what I tried to demonstrate in a qualitative empirical 
research with members of the Debtors Anonymous group, who identify themselves as 
compulsive buyers and/or debtors. Cf. Bueno 2009.
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relations between these analytical dimensions are marked by what Honneth, 
in a previous debate on the relationship between institutions and patterns 
of recognition, designated as “co-evolution” (cf. Honneth 2011: 402-405).
Fourth, despite the noticeable similarity of the metaphor presented in Strug-
gle for Recognition with the analogy that opens Honneth’s more recent article, 
a significant difference consists in that in 2014 the organic body is regard-
ed as merely analogous to society as a sui generis entity, while in 1992 it is 
viewed as homologous to social patterns of mutual recognition and forms 
of individual relation-to-self. These analytical domains hence come to be 
perceived as continuously interconnected, so that the symptomatic expres-
sions of disturbances in social reproduction are differently displayed in all 
of them. In this broad conception, frictions in the interplay between social 
spheres appear as merely one form of social pathology, and only inasmuch 
as they assume forms which to some degree represent threats to the integ-
rity of social and psychic life.
Pathologies of (the Possibilities of) Freedom
In view of this definition of social pathology as a process that endangers hu-
man life on several levels, we can now reconsider another model, developed 
by Honneth in the period between the two perspectives discussed so far.6 In 
the initial formulation of this model, based on the reactualization of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right, Honneth conceived the main social pathologies of modern 
times as a result of an absolutization of partial understandings of individual 
freedom, so that individuals would no longer be able to orient themselves 
by the rational content of their social relations of communication (Honneth 
2001). Such pathologies would not only take place in the cases examined by 
Hegel, whereby legally defined freedom or moral autonomy are assumed to 
constitute the whole of individual freedom, but also in contemporary ten-
dencies to absolutize other incomplete understandings of freedom, such as 
those represented by romantic individualism or the model of mere free-
dom of choice. These were all conceived as ‘pathologies of freedom’, whose 
problematic consequences for the subjects’ self-relation found expression in 
the category of “suffering from indeterminacy”. Symptoms of this kind of 
experience were then identified not only in phenomena such as “solitude”, 
6 It was in this period that social pathologies came to be conceived as “second-order 
disorders” (Zurn 2011). Though I will not be able to further discuss this point here, I 
agree with Freyenhagen (2015) and Laitinen (2015) on the fact that the designation of 
social pathologies as ‘second-order’ phenomena can be misleading if we understand by 
that only disorders in the reflective access to primary systems of actions and norms. In 
what follows, I will reconstruct Honneth’s conception of “pathologies of freedom” in a 
way that encompasses, but is not restricted to, dysfunctional relationships between re-
flective and unreflective value-commitments.
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“vacuity” and “burden”, which Hegel analysed in his Philosophy of Right, but 
also in the “most widespread forms of the subject’s psychic failure” in cur-
rent society, such as the increasing incidence of depression (Honneth 2000).7
This model for conceptualizing social pathologies was preserved in Free-
dom’s Right, but with significant restrictions. Not only psychic illnesses lost 
the leading position they had in the previous formulation of the ‘pathologies 
of freedom’, but also these came to be seen as particular to the social spheres 
of modern law and autonomous morality. In this view, it would be specific to 
such institutional spheres – which share the characteristic of providing only 
“possibilities” of freedom – an internal tendency to continuously generate il-
lusions of the complete realization of individual freedom. This would occur 
in such spheres by way of a practical misinterpretation of their underlying 
normative regulations, generated by the same norms to which this misin-
terpretation is committed. Thus, would be constitutive to them a structural 
tendency to bring members of society to mistakenly consider mere possi-
bilities of freedom to be the whole of freedom. For their turn, the ‘ethical’ 
(sittlich) spheres of personal relationships, market relations, and democratic 
will-formation – precisely because they provide “realities” of freedom and 
thus already hold in principle the institutional conditions for its complete 
realization – would not have the internal tendency to generate systematic 
illusions. Since in these spheres “the participants [...] could not entertain the 
idea that they could realize their freedom through purely individual action”, 
structural deformations such as those prevailing in the cases of law and mo-
rality would not take place, but only misdevelopments (Fehlentwicklungen) 
arising from the influence of external factors, by means of which “the lev-
el of the realization of the underlying promise of freedom, which has been 
achieved through successful outcomes of social struggles, could either be 
entirely undone, or seriously put at risk” (Honneth 2015a: 215).
Honneth has recently reconsidered this distinction between social pathol-
ogies and misdevelopments. He now acknowledges the possibility that “the 
spheres of social freedom might [...] be vulnerable to systematic misinter-
pretation, as they cannot eliminate the possibility of having their principles 
understood merely in terms of negative freedom” (Honneth 2015a: 215). This 
signals, so to speak, a return to the broader model of pathologies of freedom 
7 The connection between partial understandings of individual freedom and forms of 
psychological suffering is also central in other texts published in the same period (Hon-
neth 2004 [2002], Hartmann and Honneth 2006 [2004]). In these articles, a diagnosis of 
the present time is developed in which paradoxical reversals of normative potentials and 
extant forms of individualism are referred to an increasing incidence of cases of depres-
sion, as analysed by Alain Ehrenberg (2009 [1998]). Hence, they can be seen as part of this 
larger group of texts dedicated to the ‘pathologies of freedom’, even if the concept of 
social pathology is only incidentally mentioned in them.
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presented in the early 2000s. One must then ask how such systematic misin-
terpretations would be possible in the ‘ethical’ (sittlich) spheres, since in these 
cases we cannot hold – as in the spheres of modern law and autonomous 
morality – that there is a misunderstanding of the incomplete character of 
the forms of freedom constitutive of those spheres. At this point we arrive 
at one of the probable reasons for Honneth’s difficulty in conceiving the 
occurrence of internal social pathologies in the ‘ethical’ spheres. Indeed, it 
was only possible to assume in Freedom’s Right that the participants in these 
spheres “could not entertain the idea that they could realize their freedom 
through purely individual action” (Honneth 2015a: 215) because their nor-
mative structure was conceived in an excessively homogeneous manner. Ad-
vancing a theory of justice that aims to proceed immanently with regard to 
social practices by finding its own principles in social reality, Honneth set 
himself the difficult task of defining, in the context of complex and hetero-
geneous societies, general normative principles that could serve as the basis 
for a critical reconstruction of their accomplishments and normative poten-
tials. To do so, however, it was necessary to assume that to each institutional 
sphere corresponds a “dominant value” (Honneth 2014 [2011]: 6). Only then 
the “stylized” (typisierend) consideration of progresses and regresses in his-
torical development would be able to take its course. However, this “socio-
logically stylized approach” with respect to the “conflictual and non-linear 
realization of these principles” (Honneth 2014 [2011]: 8) ended up losing 
sight, from a systematic point of view, of the constitutive role that normative 
conflicts between modalities of freedom might have within ‘ethical’ spheres. 
Without this, deviations in the realization of social freedom could only be 
conceived as misdevelopments caused by factors which are external to these 
spheres’ normative regulations.
Especially in the case of the market, an examination – even if ‘stylized’ – of 
the normative conflicts which are institutionally inherent to it seems nec-
essary for the conceptualization of the particular systematic misinterpreta-
tions that take place there. In order to do so, one must bear in mind that the 
normative structure of social spheres does not only comprise their partici-
pants’ self-understandings, but also the way in which social roles are struc-
tured within them, often regardless of the subjects’ explicit beliefs. This is 
particularly true for the economic sphere. Considering that social institu-
tions are the medium which enables certain forms of social relation to take 
place, if we aim at understanding the normative regulations of the market 
sphere we must look at its primary medium, namely money.8 One might 
8 This amounts to adopting a different strategy than the one taken up by Honneth in 
Freedom’s Right, which rather relies on theoretical explanations of the market and on the 
subjects’ explicit understandings about it. Cf. Honneth 2014 [2011]: 176-252.
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 recall here Georg Simmel’s arguments concerning the monetary means as 
an institution which detaches at the same time that it binds. On the one hand, 
the peculiar combination of (personal) distance and (impersonal) connec-
tion embodied by money allows for a multiplication of social bonds and the 
creation of renewed and extremely strong links between subjects: since it 
cannot be immediately consumed, the monetary means always points to the 
other participants in the economic system and, more generally, to the total-
ity of economic exchanges. Moreover, its status as a universally recognized 
means of exchange offers “grounds for an immediate mutual understand-
ing” among human subjects in such a way that Simmel deemed it partially 
responsible for the emergence of the idea of the “universally human” by the 
end of the eighteenth century (Simmel 1992 [1896]: 51). In both these re-
gards, money is seen as representing a powerful medium for the generation 
of social cooperation and, thus, can be understood as an ‘ethical’ (sittlich) in-
stitution of recognition.
On the other hand, the inevitable and entangled character of the integration 
put forward by the money economy also allows for a larger openness for the 
development of individuality and personal independence. Due to money’s 
capacity to distance what is simultaneously bound by it, monetary remuner-
ation can serve in several contexts as a guarantee of some measure of per-
sonal freedom, since in payment in cash the individual does not deliver the 
totality of her self but only impersonal results of her work (cf. Simmel 2011 
[1907]: 305-383). However, this freedom is often practiced and understood 
as a merely negative one, i.e. as freedom from something and not freedom for 
something, given the fact that money establishes a personal domain of re-
serve and choice which might remain, nonetheless, an empty realm of pure 
possibility. In this situation, as Simmel observes, it is not uncommon that 
subjects experience those “feelings, apathetic and so modern, that the core 
and meaning of life slips through our fingers again and again, that definitive 
satisfactions become ever rarer, that all the effort and activity is not actually 
worthwhile” (Simmel 1992 [1896]: 51). The structure of monetary exchange 
thus contains within itself the tendency to a restrictive practical misunder-
standing of the normative potentials it itself establishes. Given its ‘paradoxi-
cal’ normative structure, the modern economy can be thought of as a sphere 
of realization of social freedom and simultaneously as motivating practices 
shaped according to the model of negative freedom: within economic rela-
tions, agents can think and act as if they actualized social freedom precisely 
as they think and act as detached self-interested agents.
In this as in other cases, we can thus speak of social pathologies in a broad 
sense as “persistent ‘disorders’ in the course of the gradual realization of our 
rational powers” by means of which “reason fails to adequately perform its 
available potential” (Honneth 2015a: 212; cf. Honneth 2009 [2004]), without 
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having to rely on an excessively restrictive conception of the way in which 
this process occurs. One must bear in mind, however, the different forms 
taken by those disorders within each sphere. In modern law and autonomous 
morality, as Honneth points out, there is an undue extension of partial under-
standings of freedom: incomplete forms are systematically misinterpreted as 
already complete ones due to their normative one-sidedness. In the market, 
as Simmel’s arguments indicate, there is an undue restriction of social free-
dom: forms already posited as complete are systematically misinterpreted as 
incomplete ones due to their own paradoxical, self-undermining normative 
structure. In fact, even the spheres of personal relationships and democrat-
ic will-formation are potentially subject to such systematic misinterpreta-
tions, although the mechanisms via which this occurs still must be properly 
analysed. In any case, the diagnosis of social pathologies must proceed by 
analysing the internally conflicted nature of modern institutions and their 
specific tendencies for generating systematic illusions, whose problematic 
character, as the example of the market indicates, should be simultaneously 
assessed from the observer’s and the participant’s perspectives. 
Concluding Remarks
The question of a general definition of social pathology can now be briefly 
addressed. Unlike the other two models presented in “The Diseases of Soci-
ety” and Struggle for Recognition, the conception of ‘pathologies of freedom’ 
does not find its justification in an analogical or homological allusion to 
organic processes. One might question, thus, if the term ‘pathology’ should 
apply to it at all. However, the above considerations regarding the intercon-
nectedness of human life in all its levels should allow us to at least envision 
the possibility of interpreting this conception in the broader lines of the 
model at the basis of Struggle for Recognition. After all, as Honneth stated, “in 
contrast to pre-human collectives, determining what makes a human soci-
ety capable of survival always involves regarding the normative beliefs of its 
members” (Honneth 2014: 697). Human social life develops historically by 
means of transformations in the normative self-understanding of its mem-
bers, as well as through the experimental attempts to realize the values and 
ideals thus established. This process does not occur without disturbances, 
which can be regarded as social pathologies insofar as they constitute im-
pediments to the realization of what a form of life, at a given moment in its 
history, considers appropriate to itself.
On the basis of the reinterpretation of Honneth’s work carried out in this 
paper, such assumption can now appear as congenial to both the framework 
of ‘pathologies of recognition’ (presented in Struggle for Recognition) and the 
model of ‘pathologies of freedom’ (developed in Suffering from Indetermina-
cy and Freedom’s Right). Each of these perspectives can be seen to emphasize 
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a different aspect of social reproduction and its disturbances: whereas the 
former focusses on the insufficient or inadequate recognition enjoyed by cer-
tain social groups, the latter emphasizes generalized and systematic misin-
terpretations of underlying norms and values. In both cases, however, those 
occurrences consist in social pathologies to the extent that they obstruct the 
realization of our current rationality’s available potential and, as such, sys-
tematically disrupt social life at the psychological, the intersubjective, and 
the institutional levels. Only then, by referring to all these dimensions and 
their corresponding symptomatic manifestations, can one adequately com-
prehend – from a perspective that is at once observational and participatory, 
theoretically informed and empirically investigated – the internal connec-
tion between two kinds of troubled self-relations: of individuals to them-
selves and of society to itself.
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Artur Bueno
Psihički život slobode: socijalna patologija i njeni simptomi
Apstrakt
U ovom radu se razmatra odnos između intersubjektivne teorije priznanja Aksela 
Honeta i njegove političke teorije demokratskog etičkog života, pre svega tako 
što se analiziraju potencijali i teškoće vezane za koncepciju socijalne patologije. 
Uzimajući u obzir različita značenja koncepcije u Honetovom delu, rad se na po-
četku fokusira na dve formulacije: prvo, na skorašnju raspravu u „Bolestima dru­
štva“, koja se delimično može tumačiti i kao nastavak argumentacije iz Prava slo-
bode; i drugo, na implicitnu koncepciju socijalne patologije koja se može pronaći 
u Borbi za priznanje. Ove dve formulacije se u potpunosti razlikuju u pogledu 
svojih fenomenoloških, metodoloških, socijalno-ontoloških I etioloških premisa. 
Smatram da te razlike mogu bolje da se razumeju ako imamo u vidu dva različita 
shvatanja fundamentalne intuicije koja leži u osnovi pojma socijalne patologije: 
razumevanje u formi analogije odnosno homologije. Kroz eksplikaciju nekih od 
realnih ili potencijalnih diskrepancija između ove dve koncepcije, cilj rada je da 
se ponudi jedna preliminarna osnova za povezivanje ove dve varijante u okviru 
jedne sveobuhvatne koncepcije pojma socijalne patologije. U svetlu svega na-
vedenog, rad na kraju kritički razmatra treću koncepciju koja je predstavljena u 
Patnji neodređenosti i kasnije razvijena, uz određena ograničenja, u Pravu slobode. 
Konačno, predložena je jedna definicija socijalne patologije koja može da spoji 
različite doprinose svake koncepcije, ujedno izbegavajući njihove zamke.
Ključne reči: socijalna patologija, priznanje, sloboda, patnja, socijalna ontologija, 
analogija, homologija, Aksel Honet

